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Note:  The names of organizations and individuals have been masked for confidentiality while the draft is under 
review.  This is not for circulation or distribution in any form – it is only for pilot use at MIT for educational, feedback 
and assessment purposes.  The study neither represents what is purely “best” or “worst” practice – it is a 
presentation of complex system realities in order to help depend understanding of these issues.
Introduction and Overview
The Riverdale Assembly Plant of the Autoco Company is in the process of passing what 
can be thought of as the point of new return in the implementation of the Autoco 
Manufacturing Systems (AMS).  For many individuals at all levels of the organization it 
would be harder to return back to the mass production way of operating than it would be 
to continue in the implementation of lean manufacturing principles and practices.  For 
example, as one area manager commented, “a year ago I would have fought you tooth 
and nail if you wanted to take away my safety stock; now, I would fight you just as hard if 
you tried to put it back in.”  Similarly, an hourly team leader commented, “I thought long 
and hard before deciding to seek the team leader position.  I really wasn’t sure if it was 
consistent with my role as an alternate committeeperson for the union.  Now that I am in 
the role, however, I can’t imagine not having team leaders in the plant.”
This is a pivotal situation in the auto industry.  In North America there are some new 
auto plants that have been established from the outset with new, ”lean” manufacturing 
systems.  Commonly termed “greenfield” plants since they are typically build in open 
green fields, these plants often benefit from having newly hired workforces and 
management teams all trained to operate the new manufacturing system.   Most 
Japanese “transplants” (Japanese owned facilities established in North America) are 
greenfield plants.  They utilize lean principles and practices, such as, a team-based 
operation, just-in-time delivery of components, worker-led statistical quality control, 
preventative maintenance, and material flow.  However, most of existing North American 
auto plants are not like this.  They are termed “brownfield” plants, with most having 
operated for many decades on the basis of a mass production work system.  The 
challenge facing Riverdale and these other plants is to transform their operations in 
ways that will allow them to achieve the quality, safety, cost, flexibility and other benefits 
enjoyed by the newer plants – while still maintaining production and attending to 
historical traditions and practices.
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The Riverdale plant dates back more than half a century, with the workforce represented 
by the Metal Workers Union (MWU).  The plant population has fluctuated over the years 
with a peak of over 7,000 employees and a current payroll of around 3,500 employees.
There is a long history of joint, union-management activities at Riverdale, beginning with 
the joint skilled trades apprenticeship program and the joint safety program, which have 
been in place for many decades, it was not until the early 1980s that joint activities 
expanded to include Worker Participation (WP) and joint training.  The Worker 
Participation Groups (WPGs) were voluntary, with one in each department of a plant. 
The joint training activities were initially begun to serve displaced workers laid off from 
the auto industry, but quickly expanded to include training programs for active workers. 
In the early 1990s a Total Preventative Maintenance (TPM) initiative was also begun on 
a joint basis.  The mid 1990s saw the first program to involve hourly production workers 
in the design and development of a new car model, which led to notable improvements 
for some components.  
Despite this long history of joint activities, there were many complex tensions in the 
Riverdale plant.  For example, during the mid 1990’s there was a world-wide 
restructuring of Autoco under which many of separate joint activities for safety, worker 
participation, preventative maintenance, quality and other managers were all centralized. 
Instead of having separate joint governing committees for each activity this plant and 
others in this company were urged to combine the activities under the auspices of a 
single, plant-wide joint steering committee.  Though there was a clear logic to support 
the move, most of the champions of the joint activities experienced the shift as reduction 
in commitment to their individual initiatives. 
Also, the plant is located in an old industrial area, with a highly diverse workforce.  In the 
late 1990s, a series of sexual harassment lawsuits served as a “wake-up call” to union 
and management leadership alike.  The resulting settlements involved extensive training 
in diversity and respect for the entire plant population as well as the establishment of a 
plant-wide diversity council.  
Initial Launch of a Lean Manufacturing System
It was during the mid to late 1990’s that the plant first began implementation of the 
Autoco Manufacturing System (AMS) – a version of lean production developed by this 
company.  In 1996 a set of union and management AMS coordinators were trained.  In 
1997 the entire plant was shut-down for a plant-wide “town hall” meeting in which 
management leaders, projected on large video screens, announce the launch of the 
Autoco Manufacturing System.  The body shop was selected as the initial pilot 
implementation area, with extensive resources concentrated on the training of newly 
formed Continuous Improvement Teams (CITs).  A central Plant Implementation Team 
(PIT) was established with union and management representation.  
In 1998 the plant sought to expand the effort to other parts of the plant, including the 
engine line, the paint shop, and the trim/final assembly areas.  The central Plant 
Implementation Team was disbanded – with the members each assigned to separate 
departments.  Unfortunately, there were a series of management personnel moves 
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around the same time that led to a nearly complete turnover of the Plant Operating 
Committee, including the Manufacturing Manager, some of the Area Managers 
responsible for the production departments and Managers responsible for Human 
Resources, Quality, Maintenance, Finance and Material Handling.  
When a new plant manager arrived in 1999, he found newly forming Continuous 
Improvement Teams around the plant, but without many resources devoted to 
supporting the teams.  For example, weekly team meetings would be held, but there 
were few mechanisms to handle requests for information, maintenance support and 
other forms of assistance from the teams.  The many former joint activities had been 
combined into a single forum, but each only had enough time to give a brief status report 
before some “hot” issue would take over the agenda in the meetings.  The members of 
the Plant Implementation Team were feeling isolated in their respective departments. 
Front-line supervisors and superintendents were told to become more participative 
managers, but the pressure to “make the numbers” in production were undiminished. 
Throughout the plant, people who had built up their hopes for the new initiative were 
disappointed by the results – a “hope/heartbreak” cycle all too familiar to management 
and labor alike.
Accelerated Implementation of AMS
Two related, pivotal events took place in the year 2000.  First, the plant was awarded a 
new model to replace its current product – with the launch of the new model scheduled 
for in 2003.  Second, the plant was picked to be one of a select group of plants 
(spanning all the major product lines of the company) in which implementation resources 
would be concentrated to accelerate the implementation of the Autoco Manufacturing 
System.  This would be a test as to whether a lean production system could be 
implemented in an accelerated way in a brownfield plant.
The first responses just involved an intensification of previous activities.  A training 
“bubble” of workers were hired to back-fill for different areas of the plant as the entire 
workforce was training in group process skills, basic equipment maintenance, and a 
reinforcement of the sexual harassment and diversity training.  
While there were still many of the voluntary Worker Participation (WP) program groups 
in the plant, the focus shifted to Continuous Improvement Teams (CITs) with a 
mandatory half-hour meeting per week.  The new plant manager was under pressure 
from some corporate executives to move the plant quickly to an entirely team-based 
structure.  He resisted, however, stating that the maintenance and other support 
resources could only provide 16 new teams with the level of support needed.
Working together on a joint basis, the union and management leadership reached an 
agreement to establish Team Leaders for newly established CITs.  There were not, 
however, sufficient resources to hire additional Team Leaders for all the CITs.  There 
were some new hires, but others moved into these roles from existing positions in the 
factory, such as repair and inspection positions.  The need to establish the Team Leader 
role had long been recognized by union and management leadership, but there were 
always political pressures associated with this concept (Would the Team Leaders just 
become a “straw boss?” Would the restructuring the existing positions take away highly 
preferable jobs?).
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The union and management leadership attended a lean “boot camp” run by the central 
corporate AMS office which included various simulation exercises, briefings and the 
chance to “shadow” team leaders for a few hours in lean manufacturing settings.  As one 
Area Manager reported, “the boot camp was a real eye opener.”
Understanding the Value Stream 
In addition to accelerating previous activity, there were new initiatives.  First, the plant 
conducted a value stream map in the motor line area.  This highlighted certain 
“constraint” operations that were bottlenecks in production.  As part of this process, the 
hourly and salaried workforce conducted a series of “waste walks,” identifying over $60 
million in potential improvement opportunities.  As CITs begain to address some of these 
opportunities parts of the production line were changed – with in-process inventory 
removed and the overall “footprint” of the operation reduced.  As the plant’s 
manufacturing manager observed, “We soon realized that we had to re-do the value 
stream map.  With each improvement, the operation changed and the old map no longer 
applied.  We ended up revisiting the value stream map every two or three weeks in 
some areas.”  
As the value stream method spread to other parts of the plant, a growing number of 
suggestions emerged to change line-layouts – from hourly and salaried employees. 
Where the changes had a potential impact on jobs, the local union and management 
leaders become directly involved.  Although a potentially controversial situation, the 
tensions were somewhat reduced when an early redesign effort ended up creating new 
positions in the plant in which it was established that the “kitting” of certain parts could 
be brought into the plant and done by employees on partial disability leave.  This 
represented a net gain of jobs for the union, a constructive employment opportunity for 
certain employees, and an aid to efficiency for management.
A parallel set of value stream maps were conducted for the plant as a whole – covering 
external suppliers and delivery systems.  The plant-wide value stream map was 
integrated with the new product development efforts.  It quickly became clear that the 
“lean” requirements of the new product were going to be difficult to achieve given the 
geographic spread of the supply-chain.  This led to a unique plant proposal, which was 
for the creation of supplier park adjacent to the plant.  Constructing the proposal was a 
delicate process.  The corporate Purchasing function initially resisted the idea as cost 
prohibitive.  The plant and the new product engineers had to construct a business case 
regarding the benefits associated with the additional lean capability.  Concurrently they 
had to meet with city officials to address a range of tax abatement and site improvement 
issues.  Key executive champions at the Director, Executive Director and Vice President 
levels were all involved in this effort, which culminated in the 2001 joint announcement 
with the city of the planned supplier park.
Bridging across the value stream were over a dozen design teams, many of which 
reached out to actively engage production operators and managers.  The focus was on 
ensuring the manufacturability of the new designs.  There was some variation across the 
design teams in the lever of involvement of manufacturing, as well as some variation in 
the level of understanding of lean production principles.  While the level of integration 
does represent important progress, there is not an enduring set of mechanisms 
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designed to ensure that this type of upstream manufacturing involvement characterizes 
all product development efforts.
During 2001, the implementation of new material flow systems was significantly 
accelerated.  This included the establishment of “marketplaces” for large components 
and commodity items, as well as line-side racks and other storage set-ups to ensure 
minimal in-process inventory and ergonomic presentation of parts and components. 
Pressure was also brought to bear on external suppliers to ship smaller batches on more 
of a “just-in-time” basis, with some even delivering parts using what is termed “in-line 
vehicle sequencing (ILVS).  Unfortunately, there was not a direct correspondence 
between the suppliers who shifted their operations and the parts of the plant changing its 
material flow operations.  As a result, some suppliers ended up having to sort through 
the increased cost of delivering many small batches that the relevant area of plant 
couldn’t fully utilize.  As well, other parts of the plant were ready for this sort of support 
from suppliers, but the suppliers were not ready to provide it.  Even where there was a 
match between the internal plant flow capability and the external supplier flow capability, 
it did not always match the areas where the new Continuous Improvement Teams (CITs) 
and Team Leaders had been established.   
Despite the many complications in coordinating material flow improvement efforts, the 
plant has made significant improvements in reducing the number of days of inventory on 
hand.  It ahs also achieved the highest rating for material flow practices in an assembly 
plant – based on the internal, annual corporate assessment process.    
A key innovation in the plant has been the development of a systematic method for 
addressing quality concerns prior to making the shift to a full “andon” system, where 
workers can press a “caution” or a “stop” button to signal quality concerns.  This is 
designed to enable a transition from having inspectors at the end of each production line 
to having line operators responsible for their own first-time through quality.
Infrastructure, Stability, and Continuous Improvement
Although the focus of “lean” principles emphasizes customer “pull” and material/product 
“flow,” there is a prior level of stability needed before either flow or pull can occur.  The 
reduced inventory and other lean practices can become significant liabilities if the work 
system is unstable.  Prior to stability, however, the parties identified the need to 
strengthen what became termed the joint infrastructure.  
Addressing infrastructure issues was not easy.  Both union and management leadership 
had to learn to see gaps or “disconnects” in a constructive, non-blaming way.  In fact, 
sustained attention to these social infrastructure issues did not really begin until early in 
2001 – when the Plant Manager and the local union Bargaining Committee Chairperson 
co-led a series of sessions on infrastructure.  Participating in these sessions was the 
Plant Operating Committee, the Plant Bargaining Committee and the Plant 
Implementation Team. 
For example, the parties learned at one of these sessions that there was no existing 
forum or process to ensure that requests for maintenance support from Continuous 
Improvement Teams.   Both production and maintenance managers could have been 
blamed for this “disconnect.”  Instead, the parties enlisted support from all key 
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stakeholders to form a short-term “Kaizen Shop” to handle CIT requests, with the focus 
then shifting to the overall alignment of maintenance support operations.
In this context, the plant-wide joint steering committee had to shift away from just being a 
forum for status reports on various joint activities.  Instead, it had to take on 
responsibility for constructing joint visions, strategic planning and coordination of 
implementation activities.
With maintenance and leadership support increasingly clear, the plant set about to 
ensure the placement of Team Leaders with Continuous Improvement Teams 
throughout the plant.  During the year 2001, 88 Team Leaders were appointed, for 
example, in the final assembly areas (44 on day shift and 44 on afternoon/evening shift) 
and approximately half to one quarter as many in each of the other production areas – 
such that most work areas in the plant are now team-based operations, with Team 
Leaders.
The importance of a re-invigorated joint infrastructure was illustrated by efforts to move 
from a containment approach to quality to more of an in-station approach.  A group of 
external consultants with experience in a Japanese transplant operations introduced a 
mechanism to improve the visual presentation of job procedures for quality, safety and 
other matters.  This was done with input from front-line workers, but did not involve the 
union’s health and safety representative, quality representative, or job security/time 
study representative.  Needless to say, this oversight temporarily halted forward 
progress on the new visual display mechanism and created a new set of trust issues for 
the parties to work through.
Another key aspect of the infrastructure and stability involved the capability of front-line 
supervision and middle managers.  All of these individuals has been promoted to their 
managerial roles based on their hard-driving approach under a mass production system. 
There were key gaps in their interactive skills, as well as in their substantive knowledge 
of lean manufacturing principles.  In response, the Plant Manager and the Lean 
Manufacturing Manager began a series of 30-45 minute single-point lessons for each 
area of the plant.  The participants included Superintendents, Supervisors, Union 
Committeepeople and Team Leaders.
Conducted at the shift-overlap time on a different day of the week for each area of the 
plant, they prepared these lessons on a range of relevant topics.  In each case, there 
was the expectation that the material would be applied on the job and the participants 
would be able to return a week later prepared to discuss lessons learned.  As the 
manufacturing manager commented, “these single point lessons were like a lear jet 
taking off – they really accelerated out efforts.”  She further reported that the participants 
would show up a week later with carefully prepared presentations summarizing their 
application efforts – motivated by hearing the single point lessons from their bosses 
rather than a specialized trainer.
Despite the reported value of these sessions, there are still significant challenges facing 
plant.  For example, in the early fall of 2001, the corporate Vice President for Vehicle 
Operations conducted a regular visit to the plant and expressed concern about the 
continuous improvement efforts of a number of the Teams – based on the lack of detail 
posted on the work area visual display boards and subsequent conversations with 
operators, supervisors and middle managers.   There was particular concern – shared 
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by plant management leadership – around the capability of many of the front-line 
supervisors and superintendents to reinforce and drive the new work system.  
During 2001, plant safety was the focus of a major case-management initiative, as well 
as other targeted safety improvement efforts.  The results were dramatic, with a 
reduction of 378% in lost time cases and 375% in what is termed the severity rate. 
Worker Compensation costs were also reduced by approximately 62%.
The J.D. Power quality metric improved by 14% from 2000 to 2001, which is an indicator 
of initial product quality assessed through customer surveys.  Customer satisfaction 
numbers remained essentially unchanged during this time period, however.
A final, almost intangible aspect of the changes taking place in this plant has involved 
leadership – at many levels.  At the corporate level, the Vice President for North 
American Vehicle Operations conceived the accelerated implementation strategy and 
then reinforced the effort with regular visits and coaching support for everyone from the 
managers to front-line operations.  The Director for Manufacturing Operations 
championed the use of value stream and quality operating principles, as well as the 
supplier park.  The International Union has provided strong support for the efforts to 
create new jobs in the location, as well as appropriate caution in the need to link 
improvement efforts with the existing joint infrastructure.  The Plant Manager has 
established the highest ethical standard on issues of integrity and respect, driving 
performance while valuing knowledge.  The Manufacturing Manager has become a 
coach and mentor for people all across the plant, always reinforcing learning about lean 
principles and practices while maintaining the discipline needed to run a large 
automobile assembly plant.  The local union leadership has embraced continuous 
improvement in the work system as central to long-term job security and growth in this 
location.  And a generation of new leaders is emerging across the plant.
Conclusion
The story of the Riverdale Assembly Plant is still unfolding.  Substantial gains have been 
made in the way this work system operates.  For many key stakeholders it would be 
unthinkable to go back to the older, mass production approach.  At the same time, there 
is much to be done before this transformation is complete.  A key question remains – will 
a “brownfield” plant that completes the journey to becoming a lean production system 
end up stronger than a “Greenfield” plant that has operated this way all along?
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1. What do you see as the top three challenges in transforming an existing brownfield 
plant into a lean production system?
2. What are the top three strengths and the top three weaknesses in the 
transformation process undertaken in Riverside up to this point?
3. Do you think this plant has passed the “point of no return” – where it is harder to 
revert back to the old approach than it is to continue forward with the transformation?
a. What are the biggest vulnerabilities of the change process, i.e., what events 
or process failures might derail the change effort and start it to revert back to 
the old approach?
b.  What would you do to address these vulnerabilities?
4. What systems changes are required in other parts of an enterprise to support a plant 
that has reached this stage of transformation? 
5. Do you believe that a “brownfield” plant can end up just as capable in terms of lean 
manufacturing – or even more capable – than “Greenfield” plant that was designed 
to be lean from the outset?  Put differently, what should our expectations for 
performance be for this plant?
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